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than use o’Connor’s last section, and (2) have students read specific 
design arguments and replies. Despite these reservations, this work is 
a great reminder of the value of philosophy of religion in an introductory 
context: serious discussion of God, evil, and design touches on issues of 
modal logic, free will and determinism, epistemic justification, and so 
much more.
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In a  time when most would consider the doctrine of purgatory as 
problematic and medieval, Jerry l. Walls rehabilitates the doctrine 
for the purpose of contemporary discussion. As a  philosopher in the 
Protestant and Wesleyan tradition, Walls brings fresh eyes to the doctrine 
of purgatory that is often associated with roman Catholicism. In the 
spirit of C.S. lewis, Walls offers us a feast of thoughts on purgatory that 
logically and coherently link salvation and sanctification in this world to 
glorification in the next. Purgatory is also the culmination of a series of 
works Walls has written on the afterlife with Hell: The Logic of Damnation 
and Heaven: The Logic of Joy.
As to the structure of the work, Walls proceeds from the historical, 
the philosophical, to a  contemporary construction of the doctrine 
of purgatory by drawing from C.S. lewis on salvation and purgatory. 
The aim of the book is to assess the logic of the doctrine of purgatory 
and provide a  view that has ecumenical promise not only to roman 
Catholics, but to the rest of the Christian tradition  – the orthodox 
Church and the Protestant Church. In chapter 1, Walls offers a  short 
canvassing of historical views on purgatory. Walls proceeds to look 
at objections from his tradition in chapter 2. In chapter 3, he offers 
various models of purgatory, broadly including Satisfaction models and 
Sanctification models. In chapters 4 and 5, he considers the problem of 
personal identity in purgatory, specifically the notion of stability and 
change, and the possibility of a  ‘second chance’ for those who did not 
accept the satisfaction offered in Christ. The last two chapters include 
a constructive proposal of purgatory that is ecumenical in nature and 
a summing up of findings.
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Walls explores the rationale and ground for the vision of God after 
somatic death. Walls argues that this is non-negotiable in the Christian 
tradition. We cannot go before God with an unholy character, but we must 
have a nature that is without sin. This is true if for no other reason than 
the fact that we cannot see God in all of his holiness without ourselves 
being holy. There is reason to think that when humans die, specifically 
those who have been ‘redeemed’, they are in fact not holy or perfect. If this 
is true in conjunction with the belief that we, as believers, will see God 
when we die, then an ensuing dilemma arises. The former precludes the 
latter. Walls considers four options on the nature of persons in heaven. 
We may enter the afterlife with imperfections, believers may not ever 
find their way to God, we may be instantaneously transformed at death 
or we are cleansed in purgatory prior to entering heaven (p. 6). The last 
two are the only feasible solutions that Walls considers throughout the 
book. The manner in which he develops a case in favour of purgatory is 
worth considering. To this we now turn.
Walls begins his case by establishing the foundation for the discussion 
in Scripture and in history – this is the first highlight. He makes apparent 
that the Scriptural case in favour of purgatory is slim, but that the logic 
is implicit within Scripture that is later teased out by Divines within 
Christian tradition (p.  13). He also mentions the Scriptural ground 
for thinking there are differing regions between heaven and hell that 
establish the possibility for purgatory. one example he cites is from the 
story of the rich man and lazarus where lazarus is portrayed as being 
in hell temporarily and others are temporarily in Abraham’s bosom 
(p. 13). However, this is clearly a teaching that favours the doctrine of 
the intermediate state between somatic death and physical resurrection. 
That interim period seems to be a  designated period of time and can 
be readily interpreted as somewhere on the earth that we presently 
experience. Nonetheless, this does open up a  slim possibility that 
Scripture is not closed to the notion of purgatory, but I must emphasize 
its slim possibility. later he refers to Divines that support the doctrine 
of purgatory and further develop the notion – one notable supporter is 
Augustine. Augustine is noteworthy for influencing the notion of three 
states in the afterlife that correspond to three kinds of persons in the 
afterlife. The three categories of persons and states in the afterlife include 
those who are wicked in hell, those who are not ready for heaven in 
purgatory, and the blessed in heaven (p. 16).
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In this chapter, Walls notes the influential motivations for the 
development of the doctrine of purgatory and some initial reasons for 
rejecting it. The rise of the doctrine of purgatory is due to five influences 
within Church history, which include: social/economic factors, the 
rise in thinking about morality in terms of proportionality, a  growth 
in thinking about justice, the shift in thinking after the 12th century to 
the intermediate state and, finally, the general consensus that pain has 
some desirable effects on moral formation (pp. 20-21). In terms of its 
rejection, Walls is quick to point out that a dismissal of it is due to its 
lack of Scriptural support, its abuses in medieval Christianity and its 
potential undermining of Christ’s work on the cross. Walls argues that 
there may be reason to think that Scripture does not exclude the doctrine 
of purgatory. He also argues that while it may have been abused this 
in no way undermines the doctrine as potentially true. The doctrine of 
Christ’s work is taken up in the next chapter.
A second highlight of Purgatory is found in chapter 3, the ‘models of 
Purgatory’. Here, Walls develops two broad categories of thinking about 
purgatory. This is essential for understanding the rest of his argument in 
the book. Walls develops what is called the satisfaction model and the 
sanctification model of purgatory. He argues that a  satisfaction model 
has little to offer by way of establishing a common ground suitable for all 
sects of Christianity to unite, but that the sanctification model provides 
us with a suitably robust conception of the doctrine of purgatory that 
avoids contradicting theological essentials found in eastern orthodoxy 
or Protestantism. The logic of purgatory on the sanctification model is to 
finish the process of making persons actually holy. This is not to say that 
the person is not legally justified before God or not acceptable in God’s 
mind, but that he is not actually righteous (p. 61). This model, arguably, 
does nothing to undermine the work of Christ but emphasizes what is 
often referred to as the ‘subjective’ aspects of redemption. Another way 
of looking at this is in terms of perception. There is a  sense in which 
if our characters have not been suitably developed toward a  good we 
will not have a suitable nature to enjoy a particular good. I may know 
and be committed to the fact that exercise is good for my physical body, 
but until I have suitably conditioned my body exercise is just painful. 
later, it can become pleasurable. In the same way if my character has not 
been suitably developed, then there is a sense in which seeing God would 
be painful, potentially far too painful to endure until I  have acquired 
certain virtues (pp. 82-91). This leads us to another highlight of the book 
218 booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
that is also essential to the argument made in favour of purgatory and it 
concerns the nature and necessity of time.
In chapter 4, ‘Personal Identity, Time and Purgatory’, Walls lays out 
some of the problems concerning the metaphysics of personal identity 
and its relationship to the doctrine of purgatory by considering variations 
of materialism, Thomism and substance dualism. He argues that all three 
are not without problems, but can coherently account for the doctrine of 
purgatory. Next, Walls discusses the necessity of time as a precondition 
for subjective transformation predicated upon a  moral agent’s ability 
to choose between right and wrong moral actions. Walls assumes 
a  libertarian notion of freedom and argues that meaningful freedom 
requires that individuals have the ability to choose, such that character 
development is conditioned upon freedom and causally requires it. 
Assuming this is true, Walls argues that this seems to assume a notion 
of time in the afterlife. by arguing for the necessity of time for change, 
Walls draws from brown and Charles Taylor in support of the intuition 
that time is necessary for the development of individual identity (p. 116).
With all that is positive about the reasons a  traditional Christian 
ought to accept the doctrine of purgatory, I  am convinced that Walls 
has not been attentive enough to the intricacies of the reformed view 
or a variation within reformed thought on the afterlife as an adequate 
alternative to purgatory. In chapter 2, Walls discusses various protestant 
objections to purgatory from a  lutheran perspective, a  reformed 
perspective and a Wesleyan perspective. Here I am specifically interested 
in his treatment of the reformed perspective and why he may not have 
given it sufficient attention. In his treatment of reformed perspectives, 
Walls relates reformation teaching to lutheran teaching in that 
sanctification is a  process of individual mortification of the ‘flesh’ or 
that nature that was ‘fallen in Adam’ and is disposed toward immorality 
(p. 42). This notion is often referred to as ‘progressive sanctification’, such 
that, after being justified on the basis of Christ’s atoning work on the cross, 
the person will over time become holy and weaken the ‘flesh’ nature and 
its habits. on page 43, Walls quotes from the Westminster Confession of 
Faith as support for the notion that after death the ‘righteous’ persons or 
persons who have been justified in Christ will be made perfect and will 
see God prior to the resurrection of the body. This is the ‘instantaneous’ 
view referred to earlier whereby God makes the saint perfect upon death. 
In addition to this, Walls, in the context of discussing edwards’ view, 
points out what is common to many reformation views that the body 
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still has remnants of sin. Throughout this chapter, he portrays this view 
as ‘ad hoc’ and degrading to the body (see especially page 45). I wish 
to respond by saying that I do not think Walls has adequately grasped 
the reformed view or at least some variations of it. It seems to me 
that what many reformed thinkers have argued for is the notion that 
at justification there is a subjective transformation or a transformation 
of the soul likened to the physical resurrection of the body. The soul 
that has been justified, you might say, has received new ‘relations’ and 
new capacities that are disposed toward holiness and perfection. At this 
moment, the individual who has been redeemed struggles, primarily 
with the physical correlate of his/her human nature. This does not mean 
that the body is intrinsically bad or that Gnosticism is being affirmed, as 
Walls has argued (p. 45). It simply means that the soul has no positive 
disposition toward evil, but the effects of sin and corruption that are 
passively received in the body remain  – hence the need for physical 
resurrection. The effects of sin and corruption somehow reside in the 
body (see romans 6; see John Calvin, John murray and robert reymond 
on the matter). This is not to denigrate the body for the soul was in the 
same position prior to justification and redemption. This pattern is not 
limited to this situation, either, but is reflected throughout Scriptural 
teaching on persons. There is always a logical, if not temporal, priority of 
sin in the soul then the body – assuming substance dualism. Arguably, 
the individual soul sinned then the body received the effects of sin and 
corruption. In the same order, the soul receives redemption, then the 
body as seen in salvation and, finally, physical resurrection.
It seems to me this can undermine the supposed ‘ad hoc’ nature of 
an  instantaneous perfection. It also may not be accurate to define it 
as instantaneous for it begins when the person makes a decisive break 
with his old life and culminates in the afterlife and the completion of 
human nature at the physical resurrection. let me make two comments 
to support this. First, the soul that is cleansed and now righteous is not 
merely righteous in some judicial sense, but is righteous in some ‘real’ 
sense. There is a  radical decisive break with the old nature and a new 
nature that is united to God that is accompanied by new accoutrements 
directed toward perfection, which follows justification. This does mean 
that the soul is able to enter into heaven and see God while disembodied. 
Furthermore, this does not undermine the fact that it generally takes 
a  great deal of time to change our character states. The reality is that 
some events in life have a greater effect on individuals than the effect of 
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other events. Additionally, some events that are conditional upon the 
will set a chain reaction for other changes, which is what I am suggesting 
concerning this variation of reformation teaching. Second, one could 
think of this as some new teleological mechanism that helps bring the 
soul to fruition after somatic death that is made complete upon the 
physical resurrection. Additionally, this undermines the objection that 
the reformed view denigrates the body because it requires the body for 
the completion of human nature and the completion of redemption. 
Whilst I and other Protestants may not be opposed in principle and may 
find much of what Walls argues in favour of Purgatory to be sensible, 
there is cause for doubt. This doubt is motivated not only by Scripture’s 
silence on the matter and a general disdain toward it within the Protestant 
tradition but also the fact that there is another solution that is rational and 
coherent to affirm. Another comment is in order concerning a reformed 
inclination to affirm a compatibilistic view of freedom. I do not see why 
someone in the Protestant-reformed tradition could hold something 
similar to what is outlined above on a libertarian view of freedom.
on a more speculative note, while humans who have been redeemed 
are holy, righteous and perfect it may also be the case that humans 
continue growing in righteousness and perfection. This would seem 
to allow for degrees, which correspond to degrees in heaven that are, 
arguably, spoken of in Scripture (see 2 Corinthians 12) or degrees of 
seeing and experiencing God that correspond metaphysically to our 
natures. This may assume that ‘time’ is real in the afterlife and that 
human persons are not simply passive recipients, but human persons 
who are actually involved in the whole process of redemption.
It seems Walls has made a  good philosophical case for purgatory 
that is consistent with the core teachings of eastern orthodoxy 
and Protestantism. Having said this, there is still reason to affirm 
an  immediate-glorification-at-somatic-death view as biblically viable 
and intellectually respectable. In the end, the doctrine of purgatory is 
rationally acceptable and logically consistent, but it is not the only option 
in town.
